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Abstract
Cybersecurity is a growing concern for governments, with the push for universal 
access to the Internet, the increasing ubiquity of social networks and the growing 
reliance on digital government service, and given a growing range of threats from 
foreign powers, terrorists and criminals. These complex issues span all government 
ministries, their agencies and contractors, plus provincial and municipal government, 
and require the state to create legal frameworks and agencies to protect data and offer 
advice to businesses and citizens, plus ensuring a sufficient supply of skilled technicians 
and engineers. In the case of South Africa, its government responded in 2015 with 
a National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF), with implementation led by 
the Ministry of State Security. The Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act 
of 2013 created the Information Regulator to ensure data privacy. The POPI regime 
is only being implemented slowly and has overly wide exemptions for national 
security. South Africa lags behind advanced economies in cybersecurity legislation, 
in government coordination, in engagement with business and citizens, and in the 
supply of skilled labour. Delays have meant it lacks the experiences obtained in 
faster moving countries, and the improvements they have made to their policies and, 
especially, implementation. Parliament has neither pressed the government for faster 
action nor explored areas where powers might have been taken that infringe human 
rights. 
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1. Introduction 
National governments are adopting cybersecurity strategies to address a wide range 
of threats (OECD, 2012), including foreign governments attacking critical national 
infrastructure (CNI) (e.g., the electricity grid in Ukraine (Zetter, 2016)), criminals 
locking then ransoming computer systems (e.g., a hospital in England (Palmer, 
2017)), hacktivists protesting against the activities of firms (e.g., Armscor (Moyo, 
2016a; 2016b)) and the bulk theft of identities (Romanosky, Telang, & Acquisti, 
2011). Such threats are of growing significance, given the pursuit by governments 
of universal Internet access and the rising use of and reliance on online government 
and commercial services, plus the ubiquity of social networks, and the emergence of 
an Internet of Things (IoT) that raises questions over the cybersecurity of objects 
as mundane as fridges and toys.1 The governance challenges that follow from this 
include coordinating cybersecurity activities and data protection across the whole 
of government, including sub-national levels (e.g., municipalities), independent 
agencies (e.g., regulators), and contractors (e.g., outsourced services) (Chertoff, 
2008). Govern ments must also influence the practices of businesses, especially 
CNI providers, as well as voluntary organisations, households, and individuals. 
Despite some national cybersecurity strategies having been reviewed and revised, 
there remain considerable challenges in ensuring these are well-constructed, cost-
effective, and subject to appropriate governance (OECD, 2015; Dean, 2016). This 
article considers the governance of cybersecurity in South Africa, a complex federal 
state with a relatively sophisticated economy (OECD, 2017), though with many 
impoverished citizens (StatsSA, 2017), who often have limited digital literacy (RIA, 
2016; Siemens, 2016), creating significant challenges for its government in assessing 
the risks from and of devising responses to:
•	 cybercrime;
•	 cyberespionage;
•	 cyberterrorism; and
•	 cyberwarfare.
In 2012, the South African Cabinet adopted a National Cybersecurity Policy 
Framework (NCPF, setting out measures and mechanisms for coordination across 
government (SSA, 2015). At the time of writing, the Information Regulator (i.e., the 
data protection authority) was not fully operational and the Cyber Warfare Strategy 
had yet to be finalised. The proposed coordination mechanisms were complex, 
making their management difficult, especially given the poor track record of inter-
ministerial coordination and the difficulties in overcoming rivalries. Moreover, there 
are only limited oversight and review mechanisms, with many activities clouded in, 
possibly unnecessary and counterproductive, secrecy. 
1  There has been one major distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack using hacked closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) cameras (Goodin, 2017), while one government has issued a warning against use of 
particular toys (Conradis, 2017),  and in one country, an adult toy manufacturer settled litigation over 
violations of the privacy of its customers (Roberts, 2017).
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There are significant challenges in assessing possible threats and in keeping such 
assessments accurate, given advances in technologies and in their uses, such as the 
evolving “dark net” (Fachkha & Debbabi, 2016; Lacson & Jones, 2016), and the 
growing offensive capabilities of a few countries and of groups of individuals, including 
terrorists (Liff, 2012; Lindsay, 2015), plus a great many everyday cybercriminals 
(Akamai, 2016; 2017; Cisco, 2017). South Africa has been the country most often 
attacked in Africa (Wolfpack, 2013; TMG Digital, 2016; Van Heerden, Von Soms, 
& Mooi, 2016), with an estimated cost in 2014 of ZAR5.8 billion (Fripp, 2014). 
While one in 10 businesses reported a cyberattack during 2015, this is expected to 
rise significantly from 2018, when reporting is, finally, made mandatory, triggering 
much greater attention to prevention and security, especially because firms can then 
be held legally liable ( Jonker, 2015). Cybercrimes are likely to be underreported by 
citizens, given their uncertainty about the capability of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) in matters of technology. There are dangers in the lobbying and 
salesmanship from those making cybersecurity systems, who may overstate the risks 
and the effectiveness of their products, in order to increase their profits. Equally, the 
intelligence services may seek greater budgets to buy such systems, an extension of 
the military-industrial complex described by Eisenhower (Brito & Watkins, 2011).
The African National Congress (ANC) has been in government since 1994, 
following the first elections under universal franchise (Southall, 1994). However, it 
has been losing its attractiveness to the electorate, as a result of internal rifts and 
its failures on service delivery, with President Zuma having emphasised loyalty to 
himself  (Booysen, 2015; Southall, 2015; Paret, 2016). There is an independent and 
powerful Constitutional Court, one that has shown it will hold anyone and everyone 
to account (Gibson, 2016; Roux, 2016). Whereas Parliament has often struggled 
to scrutinise complex legislation and exercises only limited oversight of budgets, 
ministers and policies (Hawker, 2003; 2007). This fits broadly within the framework 
of weak institutional endowments (North, 1990), explaining the limits to the ability 
of governments to create mechanisms and structures to deal with complex issues. If 
government is to persuade firms and individuals to adopt measures to improve their 
cybersecurity, then it needs to ensure its own activities are highly secure or, initially, 
not embarrassingly insecure, and to acknowledge the limitations of its influence, in 
order to maximise its credibility.
After 1994, governance of the intelligence community and of the wider security 
sector was never going to be easy, given the histories of the state and of the ANC, 
neither of which had shown much regard for accountability or transparency in 
intelligence and security matters. Nonetheless, section 198 of the 1996 Constitution, 
on the governance of the intelligence services, expressly controls what is now the 
State Security Agency (SSA), requiring it to observe the rights of citizens (Klaaren, 
2015). Whether those rights are protected and the extent to which the SSA prefers 
to practice its own exceptionalism, believing that it is above rather than under the 
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Constitution, are matters of contention (Nathan, 2010; Van der Westhuizen, 2013). 
The only authoritative inquiry found that officials drafting and vetting operational 
policies lacked an adequate understanding of the Constitution and its protections 
for citizens (Matthews, Ginwala, & Nathan, 2008). A major concern has been that 
the SSA has become an instrument of senior members of the ANC, concerned more 
with its internal personal and political battles than with assessing and countering 
external and terrorist threats (Solomon, 2012; McKinley, 2013).2 This has been 
further complicated by the fusion of the ANC with the state, the party having been 
in office for over two decades, deploying its own members into all levels of the 
administration, and emphasised by President Zuma having formerly been a head of 
the ANC intelligence service. 
Assessing the relative performance of South Africa is limited by the lack of 
comparative data. Following its development of other compound indicators, the 
International Telecommunication Union produced the Global Cybersecurity Index 
(GCI) (ITU, 2017), with a view to raising awareness of the challenges.3 The title is 
disingenuous, since the GCI measures not cybersecurity, but legislative measures and 
policies on paper, which do not determine and cannot predict levels of cybersecurity 
in practice. To measure cybersecurity it would be necessary to capture the efforts of 
governments and their agencies to implement and enforce the policies, for example, 
to identify budgets, campaigns, and skills development. Unsurprisingly, the “leading” 
nations in the GCI are OECD countries with good governance, plus a couple of the 
faster moving autocracies, while South Africa is considered “maturing”, along with 
a mixed bag of countries. Commercial reports on cybersecurity point to realities as 
experienced by citizens and firms, but offer little specific information about South 
Africa (Akamai, 2016; 2017; Cisco, 2017; Microsoft, 2017; Norton, 2016; Symantec, 
2017). 
The challenges for businesses include legal liability for the loss of customer data 
and the consequential falls in share prices, loss of brand value and of customer 
loyalty (e.g., the Equifax data breach (Volz & Shepardson, 2017), and the release 
of 30 million South African IDs (Lotz, 2017)). Firms are often reluctant to admit 
to data breaches because of potential financial losses, despite such reporting being 
included in corporate social responsibility (CSR) and in some countries being a legal 
obligation under data protection laws, notably in South Africa from 2018. The King 
Committee (2016) called for the governing bodies of South African firms to be 
proactive in monitoring and responding to cyberattacks, though there has been no 
assessment of the effectiveness of corporate cybersecurity governance.
2  Cyril Ramaphosa, despite being Deputy President, was apparently spied on because of his candidacy 
for the ANC Presidency (Letsoalo, 2017).
3  One of its partners in this venture is the Egyptian regulatory authority that runs a deep packet 
inspection system for the repressive regime of Marshal Al Sisi.
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The next section examines the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework. This is 
followed by analyses of privacy and data protection. Surveillance is then examined, 
insofar as information is made public, followed by an analysis of cybersecurity skills. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn and issues identified for further research.
2. The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF)
Like many other laws and policies, the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework 
was partly the result of diffusion (Meseguer, 2005; Gilardi, 2010), drawing on sources 
such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the US, which 
are more advanced users of technology and have faster-moving policy formulation 
(Grobler, Van Vuuren, & Leenen, 2012; Van Vuuren, Phahlamohlaka, & Leenen, 
2012; 2014). The South African government used some foreign experiences and 
texts, raising questions about the effectiveness of its adaptation to the legal and 
political systems and cultures, and the degree to which it has designed something it 
had the administrative and technological skills to deliver.
The development of the NCPF was slow, not helped by President Zuma moving 
responsibility between Cabinet “clusters” and between departments, nor by his 
rapid turnover of ministers. The Minister of Communications published a detailed 
cybersecurity policy draft (Nyanda, 2010), which took two years to be approved 
by Cabinet and a further three years to be published, and only in Afrikaans and 
English.4 By then, it was the Minister of State Security who was in charge (SSA, 
2015), with the State Security Agency (SSA) responsible for implementing the 
policy, roadmap and strategy. Nonetheless, the Department for Telecommunications 
and Postal Services (DTPS), inheritor of part of the work of the Department of 
Communications (DoC), retained significant responsibilities.
Implementation of the NCPF requires extensive coordination across government 
(see Table 1), with the lead assigned to the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
Cluster of ministers ( JCPS, n.d.). A Cybersecurity Response Committee, chaired by 
the Director-General of State Security, with the heads of the relevant departments 
and agencies, was charged with strategy and decision-making, and required to 
identify and prioritise areas for intervention, based on assessments of possible 
threats.5 The closeness to state security means there is only limited transparency 
or oversight, though DTPS (2017a) did give an initial briefing to its Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee. One weakness was that the national e-government strategy 
had not been updated for many years (DPSA, 2001), until the recent addition of a 
complementary strategy, strangely this came from DTPS, based on the ECT Act 
(DTPS, 2017b; 2017d). It admitted significant failures in implementing the 2001 
policy and added some limited security measures, notably a Security Sub-Committee 
4  There are nine other official languages.
5  The Cybersecurity Response Committee is supported by the SSA Cybersecurity Centre.
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of the National e-government Steering Committee, though it failed to mention the 
NCPF.6
Table 1: Departments directly engaged in cybersecurity (RSA, 2016)
Cluster Department Legislation or policy Agencies and centres
Justice, Crime 
Prevention and 
Security Cluster
Cybersecurity 
Response 
Committee
State Security National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework (NCPF)
Regulation of Interception 
of Communications 
and Provision of 
Communication-related 
Information Act (RICA)
Protection of State 
Information Bill
State Security Agency (SSA)
SSA Cybersecurity Centre
Electronic Communications 
Security Computer Security 
Incident Response Team (ECS-
CSIRT, n.d.)
Justice and 
Constitutional 
Development
Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill
National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA)
South African Police Service 
(SAPS)
Defence Cyber Warfare Strategy Cyberwarfare Command 
Centre HQ
COMSEC Ltd
Telecommunications 
and Postal Services
Electronic Communications 
and Transactions (ECT) Act
Cryptography Regulations 
(RSA, 2006)
e-government Strategy and 
Roadmap (DTPS, 2017d)
National Cybersecurity 
Advisory Council (NCAC)
National Cybersecurity Hub
Cyber Inspectorate
Economic 
Sectors, 
Employment and 
Infrastructure 
Development 
Cluster
Trade and Industry Companies Act -
Public Service and 
Administration
Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (PAI)
Governance of Corporate IT 
Framework (DPSA, 2012)
e-government strategy *
State Information Technology 
Agency (SITA)
Governance and 
Administration
Public Service and 
Administration
- -
Justice and 
Constitutional 
Development
- -
* Additionally, the various provinces have adopted their own e-government strategies.
6  It maintained the 1996 Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS) ensuring “the national 
interests of the Republic are protected”.
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The overarching objective of government is (RSA, 2010a): 
Outcome 3: All people in South Africa are and feel safe.
Based on this, there was a “delivery agreement” between the Presidency and the 
Justice Ministerial Cluster (RSA, 2010b), calling for: 
Development of a Cybersecurity Policy and the implementation thereof. 
Development of capacity to combat and investigate cyber crime.
Nonetheless, the ability to combat and investigate breaches of cybersecurity seems to 
lie much further in the future, as does the prosecution of individuals, given the need 
to implement the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill and to train police, prosecutors 
and judges.
Formerly, the Department of Communications (DoC) sat in the Economic Sectors 
Ministerial Cluster, responsible for the communications regulatory authority and for 
broadcasting, posts and telecommunications markets. In 2014, the DoC was split, 
with the creation of the new Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services 
(DTPS), under a former security minister, taking over its work on cybersecurity. A 
National Cybersecurity Advisory Council (NCAC) had been created to aid the DoC 
on policy and technical issues (see Table 2), but is reported as having done very little 
(IT News Africa, 2013).1 Nonetheless, in 2017 applications were invited to serve on 
a new NCAC (DTPS, 2017c). 
Table 2: National Cybersecurity Advisory Council (Oxford, 2013)
Name Aff iliation
Barend Taute (Chairman) Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
Ritasha Jethva (Vice-chairman) Accenture
Dr Khomotso Kganyago Chief Security Advisor, Microsoft South Africa (deceased 2014)
Prof Tana Pistorius Department of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa (UNISA)
Mark Heyink Attorney
Sizwe Snail Attorney
Collen Weapond Fraud and corruption specialist Advocate
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Chapter XII of the Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of 
2002 provides for the establishment of a Cyber Inspectorate, with power to inspect, 
search, and seize content, in pursuit of the unacceptable. It was intended to assist law 
enforcement agencies, and to provide services directly to the public and businesses. 
No implementing regulations were ever promulgated, no Cyber Inspectors were 
appointed, and no offences created by Chapter XIII were ever prosecuted.
In the US, one organisational solution to widespread cyberattacks was the creation 
by government and by the private sector of Computer Security Incident Response 
Teams (CSIRTs) (Wiik, Gonzalez, & Kossakowski, 2006; Bronk, Thorbruegge, & 
Hakkaja, 2006; Grobler & Bryk, 2010). This followed the isolated and uncoordinated 
responses to the “Morris worm” or “Internet worm” in 1988, which was seen as 
having been poorly handled, with duplicated efforts and conflicting solutions. 
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT*) Coordination Center, setting a 
pattern replicated by many organisations and governments. The various CSIRTs 
soon began ad hoc exchanges of information, formalised from 1990 through the 
Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST, n.d.; Gonzalez, 2005; 
Wiik & Kossakowski, 2005), including significant numbers of face-to-face meetings. 
Three South African CSIRTs participate in FIRST: 
•	 First National Bank;
•	 government (ECS-CSIRT); and
•	 Standard Bank Group.
In 2015, DTPS launched the National Cybersecurity Hub (NCH, n.d.)), aimed 
at informing business, voluntary organisations and the public, and to serve as the 
national CSIRT, a contact point for both domestic and foreign CSIRTs (Cwele, 
2015).
Like other countries, South Africa adopted a variety of approaches to e-government 
at national, provincial and municipal levels, purportedly all under the Department of 
Public Service and Administration (Trusler, 2003; Mutula & Mostert, 2010; Cloete, 
2012; DPSA, n.d.; Mawela, 2017), though most recently from DTPS (2017b). 
Beginning in 1997, there was a slow process of consultation and adoption, aimed at 
increasing productivity and efficiency for government and improving convenience 
for citizens. Implementation often failed to achieve the planned goals, due to the 
limited capacity and the lack of willingness of ministers and officials to engage with 
the challenges. Little attention was given to cybersecurity, despite risks to human 
rights from the misuse of the large volumes of personal data held by government, or 
its theft by cybercriminals.
The 2010 draft NCPF acknowledged the lack of coordination within government 
and the insufficiency of existing legal measures needed to counter and prosecute 
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cybercrime. It aimed to:
•	 facilitate the establishment of relevant structures in support of cybersecurity;
•	 ensure the reduction of cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities;
•	 foster cooperation and coordination between government and private sector;
•	 promote and strengthen international cooperation;
•	 build capacity and promoting a culture of cybersecurity; and
•	 promote compliance with appropriate technical and operational cybersecurity 
standards.
Organisational deficiencies were to be reduced by creating NCAC (see Table 2), with 
officials drawn from a range of ministries and agencies, and with five independent 
members, to coordinate implementation of policies. It was to work with the 
government CSIRT, responding to breaches, incidents, and threats though there is 
very little evidence it has yet done anything. 
A central challenge for government is the promotion of cybersecurity measures 
amongst:
•	 government (at national, provincial and municipal levels); 
•	 general public;
•	 private sector (both domestic and foreign firms);
•	 civil society; and 
•	 special interest groups.
The Minister of Justice and Correctional Services (2015) published a draft 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill in 2015, inviting comments, and later announced 
that a revised version was to be laid before Parliament (Minister of Justice, 2017b). 
However, it failed to publish either the comments received or an analysis of their 
content, making it impossible to know the extent to which the Department  had 
responded to concerns, criticisms and proposals from experts and the general public. 
At the time of writing, the Bill is being scrutinised by the Portfolio Committee 
on Justice and Correctional Services (2017), which invited public comments and 
held two days of public hearings.7 The Bill will formally create the Cyber Response 
Committee to coordinate work across government.
Internationally, South Africa has supported a series of resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly (2010) concerning CSIRTs, protection of CNIs and, more generally, the 
work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2017).8 It has also supported 
the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber-Terrorism (IMPACT, 
n.d.), created by a UN official, but now seemingly defunct. At the 2017 ITU World 
Telecommunications Development Conference, attempts to amend Resolution 45
7  To date these have not been published, though the Department responded to them.
8  UNODC has built up a repository of national laws and policies for cybersecurity.
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(Rev. 2014) on cybersecurity failed, due to wildly differing aims amongst countries. 
South Africa signed the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (Council of Europe, 
2001), but never ratified it. It has also signed, but not ratified, the African Union 
Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (AU, 2014); indeed so 
few countries have ratified it that it is unlikely to come into force. 
As a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),9 
South Africa is subject to periodic review, though it was 14 years late in submitting 
its most recent report. Amongst many suggestions to South Africa from the UN 
Human Rights Committee (2016):
The Committee is concerned about the relatively low threshold for 
conducting surveillance in the State party and the relatively weak 
safeguards, oversight and remedies against unlawful interference with 
the right to privacy contained in the 2002 Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information 
Act. It is also concerned about the wide scope of the data retention regime 
under the Act. The Committee is further concerned at reports of unlawful 
surveillance practices, including mass interception of communications 
carried out by the National Communications Centre, and at delays in fully 
operationalizing the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013, due in 
particular to delays in the establishment of an information regulator (arts. 
17 and 21). 
A major part of any cybersecurity strategy concerns the military and its ability both 
to remain fully operational while under cyberattack and its capability to launch 
conventional and cyberattacks. The NCPF sets out the following tasks for the 
Department of Defence:
•	 address national security threats in cyberspace;
•	 combat cyberwarfare, cybercrime and other cyber ills;
•	 develop, review and update existing substantive and procedural laws to 
ensure alignment; and 
•	 build confidence and trust in the secure use of information and communication 
technologies.
The preferred military terminology is information warfare, covering a broad range of 
operations in what it terms the “InfoSphere”.
A Cyber Warfare Strategy is said to be at an advanced stage of development, 
having been submitted to the Chief of the South African National Defence Force 
(Department of Defence, 2016; 2017; Mapisa-Nqakula, 2016). In financial year 
2016/17, there was to be a Cyberwarfare Implementation Plan and in 2017/18 a 
9  https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf
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Cyberwarfare Command Centre Headquarters, the latter delayed because of financial 
constraints:
South Africa requires the protection of its cyber-domain, through (inter 
alia) a comprehensive information warfare capability, integrated into its 
intelligence-related information systems at the international, national and 
defence levels. Both defence and wider-government capabilities must be 
enhanced to secure vital networks. (Department of Defence, 2015a, p. vi)
The Department of Defence (2015b) offers very little indication of possible threats 
or of their likely origins. It seems unlikely that any country would attempt to conquer 
South Africa or to seek to carve off part, but some states might wish to destabilise 
its government (e.g., in retaliation for its involvement in other African states) or 
to attack its ruling political party. Some individuals and commercial groups might 
consider attacks that would affect the supply of minerals to the global market and 
thus their prices. However, the most obvious attacks appear likely to come from 
domestic opponents of the regime or well-financed groups engaged in corruption.10
A somewhat unusual twist in the organisational arrangements is that protection 
of state information against a cyberthreat is the primary responsibility of the State 
Security Agency through a private company, Electronic Communications Security 
(Pty) Ltd (COMSEC Pty Ltd). This company was established in 2002, with the 
primary purpose of ensuring that critical electronic communications are secure and 
protected. 
Defence networks are targets for attacks because they run command and control, 
administration, personnel, logistics and finance information systems. These networks 
thus require protection, including the use of technologies not available on the open 
market:
The department will focus on cyber security over the medium-term through 
the approval of a DOD Cyber Warfare Strategy in the FY2015/16 and 
establishing a Cyber Command Centre Headquarters by the FY2018/19. 
The latter will be executed in the Defence Intelligence budget programme 
at a projected cost of R511 million over the medium-term. (Department of 
Defence, 2015b, p. 56)
There are significant path dependencies from past decisions that limit the ability 
of government to craft its strategies and plans, and little evidence of international 
cooperation or peer review. The division of responsibilities between several 
government departments, whose ministers have changed relatively frequently, creates 
problems, noticeably in delays and in redundant or vestigial bodies. Rapid turnover
10  For example, the Gupta family, through Oakbay, engaged an expensive public relations firm from 
the UK, spending sums that, had they been used for cyberattacks, could have been extremely damaging. 
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in ministers, reconfigurations of departments and complex coordination make it 
unnecessarily difficult for government to develop expertise and to deliver results, 
similar problems of turnover in committees make parliamentary oversight much 
more difficult.  
3. Privacy and data protection
Unusually for Africa, South Africa has a common law right of privacy that dates 
from the 1950s (Burchell, 2009; Roos, 2016). A radio broadcaster consented to 
the publication of her photograph in a newspaper article, but the photograph was 
subsequently used in advertising without her consent, which was held to violate her 
right to privacy (O’Keeffe v Argus Printing, 1954).11 The courts have also recognised 
unreasonable intrusions to include bugging a room, intercepting a telephone call, 
reading private documents, and unauthorised testing of blood. Some violations of 
privacy have been treated as criminal invasions of privacy (i.e., crimen injuria).
The Constitution of 1996 protects privacy in section 14: 
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have—  
(a) their person or home searched;  
(b) their property searched; 
(c) their possessions seized; or  
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed. 
Additionally, section 10 created the right to human dignity that must also be 
respected and protected.
The Constitutional Court has concentrated on forced legislative disclosure of 
information, providing general guidelines for data protection (SALRC, 2005):
•	 was the information obtained in an intrusive manner? 
•	 was the information about intimate aspects of the subject’s personal life?
•	 was it provided for one purpose but used for another?
•	 was it disseminated to the press or general public from whom the subject 
“could reasonably expect such information would be withheld”?
Debates on security have heavy historical baggage, especially in respect of the 
long rule of the National Party, which imposed the pass laws that still colour any 
consideration of identity documents (Breckenridge, 2005; Donovan, 2015).12 A proxy 
for a national identity database was created by the mandatory registration of all SIM 
cards, which now encompasses most citizens and residents and large numbers of 
visitors. Such databases are especially attractive to hackers seeking financial rewards 
11  The arguments echoed Tolley v JS Fry & Sons Ltd [1931] UKHL 1 (23 March 1931), http://www.
bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1931/1.html 
12  The US government has incorporated biometric identities into passports for its own citizens, and 
requires visitors to have either a biometric passport or a biometric visa (including fingerprints). 
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from stealing large and inclusive sets of personal details. There are serious doubts 
about the security of such databases, notably the loss of Terabytes of data from the 
US National Security Agency (NSA) (Reuters, 2017).13 
South Africa has prepared data protection legislation, though on a peculiarly tortuous 
path (Roos, 2016):
•	 South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC)
o included in work programme in 2000
o published a paper on privacy and data protection (SALRC, 2003)
o published a paper on data protection (SALRC, 2005)
•	 Protection of Personal Information Bill in 2009
•	 Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act of 2013
o signed by President (2013)
o appointment of board member of the Information Regulator 
(Gallens, 2016).
At the time of writing, the POPI Act is not fully implemented and may not be 
until late 2018. It will enable citizens, as data subjects, to bring civil actions against 
firms for data breaches. The Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) 
Act of 2002 sets out principles for information protection and created offences 
of unauthorised access to, interception of and interference with data. However, it 
appears to have had little practical effect.
The POPI Act broadly matches the European Union legislation (EU, 1995; 2016), 
with a view to attracting outsourcing and call centre business, since data cannot 
be transferred from the EU except to countries with comparable data protection 
provisions. This reflects efforts over a number of years to attract back office processing 
and call centre activities to major urban centres  (Deloitte, 2015; Nelson Hall, 2015; 
BPESA, n.d.).
A central question concerning data protection emerges from section 6(1)(c) of POPI, 
which excludes processing by or on behalf of a public body involving national security, 
defence or public safety. This appears to give the intelligence services an entirely free 
hand in the processing of data, except that they must comply with Section 198 of 
the Constitution that, inter alia, enforces human rights. While those rights can be 
limited by statute, it is only insofar as is compatible with a democratic society. The 
subsequent section 6(1)(d) of POPI additionally exempts processing for Cabinet, an 
obscure provision, since it is in addition to national security purposes, without any 
indication of what processing the Cabinet might require. Eventually cases must be 
brought before the Constitutional Court to test the limits of the state to violate the 
right to privacy. 
13  This included hacking tools.
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In time South Africa should have a strong data protection law protecting privacy, 
combined with common law and the constitutional protections of privacy, though 
this might take a number of years. For the present, the intelligence services appear 
exempt, unless and until litigation is brought to limit their actions.
4. Surveillance
The interception of telephone calls has featured prominently in the South African 
popular press, because of the “spy tapes” concerning the then Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma and corruption allegations in the arms deal scandal (Wolf, 2011; 2015; Zuma 
v DA, 2017). The interception of postal articles and telephone calls was originally 
authorised by a minister, then from 1992 by a judge (Cohen, 2001), and since 1996, 
has been subject to the Constitution and its protection of human rights (see Table 
3). The last are limited by national security, defined in the General Intelligence Law 
Amendment Act of 2013 (GILAA), to include the protection of the people and the 
territorial integrity of the Republic against the threat of or use of force, as well as 
espionage, sabotage and terrorism. 
Table 3: Interception laws in South Africa
Statute Year Section(s) Authorisation
Post Office Act 1958 118A Minister
Interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Act
1992 1 A discharged judge designated by the 
Minister of Justice
Interception and Monitoring 
Prohibition Amendment Act
1995 1 Redefines a judge to include currently 
serving, discharged  and retired judges 
of the Supreme Court
Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision 
of Communication-related 
Information Act (RICA) 
2002 7 & 8 A judge designated by Minister of 
Justice
All state intelligence activities are governed by the National Strategic Intelligence 
Act of 1994, Intelligence Services Oversight Act of 1994, Intelligence Services Act 
of 2002, and GILAA of 2013, stipulating that covert intelligence-gathering may 
only legally be conducted by these agencies. The Safety Matters Rationalisation Act 
of 1996 repealed 34 controversial apartheid-era laws dealing with security legislation, 
though it left significant security laws untouched.
The Intelligence Services Oversight Act of 1994 created the parliamentary Joint 
Standing Committee on Intelligence ( JSCI, n.d.; Minister of Justice, 2017) and an 
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Inspector-General for Intelligence to investigate complaints, based on a framework 
set out in a white paper (RSA, 1994).14 The JSCI comprises members of the six 
largest political parties in Parliament, charged with scrutinising and reporting on the 
finances and operations of the SSA (Ahmed, 1999). There are two routes for a citizen 
to complain about surveillance: to the JSCI or the Inspector-General. Nonetheless, 
there is considerable secrecy about surveillance practices, with sporadic attention from 
investigative journalists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and university 
researchers. There have also been a critical report by Privacy International (2016) 
and the suggestions by the UN Human Rights Committee (see above). 
Figure 1: Surveillance system in South Africa
President
Department of 
Telecommunications 
and Postal Services
Ministry of 
State Security
Cell-C
MTN
Vodacom
Telkom
Infraco
Operators
Independent 
Communications 
Authority of South 
Africa
NCC
OIC
COMSEC
SASS
NIAA
State Security AgencyNational Prosecuting Authority
The Regulation of  Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act (RICA) of 2002 created:
•	 the Office for Interception Centres (OIC); and 
•	 the National Communications Centre (NCC). 
The former is domestic, while the latter provides bulk monitoring and the 
interception of signals outside the country or passing through or entering South 
Africa (see Figure 1) (Watney, 2015; McKinley, 2016). RICA requires owners of 
mobile phones to register their SIM cards with their service providers, which have to 
obtain certain customer details and pass these on to the OIC. The OIC and NCC 
provide call data records (CDRs) and interception for the intelligence services, the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC).
14  The 1996 report of the JSCI covered the first wire-tapping scandal: the NIA tapping of the SAPS.
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Related to the global adoption by businesses of CSR reporting, some service providers 
and network operators have published transparency reports on government collection 
of data and requirements to remove content from the Internet (GNI, n.d.)). The first 
transparency report by the Vodafone Group (2014) stated it was forbidden from 
publishing the scale of lawful interception on its network in South Africa. 
Judge Yvonne Mokgoro was designated to approve and oversee applications from 
authorities seeking to intercept calls, on which she is required to publish annual 
reports (Mokgoro, 2014).15 These have been intermittent, with the most recent 
report, covering 2014-15 (see Table 4), omitting any mention of IMSI-grabbers 
and limited to conventional interception. Her reports are sent to the parliamentary 
JSCI, which publishes them and considers their contents, though in closed meetings 
without publishing any minutes ( JSCI, 2017; Minister of Justice and Corrctional 
Services, 2017). The only available JSCI report is minimalist, with no reference to 
cybersecurity ( JSCI, 2015). 
According to the Review Commission (Matthews, Ginwala, & Nathan, 2008), and 
subsequent investigative journalism, the NCC has mass surveillance capabilities 
unregulated by law, which would necessarily be unconstitutional. Twice the Ministry 
has introduced legislation that sought to recognise the NCC in law; in the first 
instance the National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill was withdrawn, in 
the second instance the relevant provisions were removed during parliamentary 
deliberations.
A further concern is the unregulated use by FIC, the SSA, and the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) of IMSI-grabbers,16 devices that appear to be base stations 
belonging to mobile operators but which collect handset and SIM card details at a 
distance, with some allegedly able to perform man-in-the-middle attacks in order to 
intercept calls and data. One of these was used to jam mobile signals in Parliament 
(Primedia Broadcasting v Speaker, 2016), and another was found in a shopping mall 
in most peculiar circumstances.
While there are constitutional and legal frameworks for surveillance, these appear 
to be more honoured in the breach than in the observance, with the policies and 
practices for use of IMSI-grabbers protected from disclosure under the Promotion 
of Access to Information (PAI) Act,17 and reporting by operators of requests for 
customer data prohibited by statute. The interceptions that are reported appear to 
be remarkably few in number (see Table 4), given the high level of crime (Kynoch, 
2005);  in particular, there is a long and dishonourable tradition in South Africa 
of political assassinations and financially-motivated killings, some apparently based 
15   Judge Mokgoro noted the need to update the terminology in RICA.
16  Also known as IMSI-catchers and stingrays.
17  See, for example, Peekhaus (2014).
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on the locations of mobile phones (Shaw & Thomas, 2016; Shaw, 2017; Johnson, 
2017).18 Consequently, there is very little evidence that oversight and scrutiny are 
effective.
Table 4: Applications for directions to intercept under RICA (Mokgoro, 2014, p. 15)
State 
Security 
Agency
South 
African 
Secret 
Service
South 
Africa 
Police 
Service
Financial 
Intelligence 
Centre
South 
African 
National 
Defence 
Force
Total
Applications (new) 28 2 150 3 3 185
Re-applications 30 - 2 - - 54
Amendments 34 - 8 - 1 5
Extensions 31 - 4 - - 35
Amendments and 
extensions
13 - 18 - - 31
Entry warrants 4 - - - - 4
Section 11 66 - - - - 66
Oral intercepts 2 - - - - 2
Refused 5 * - - - - 5
Total 215 2 202 3 4 387
* No RICA confirmation
5. Skills
South Africa has had a shortage of ICT skills for many years, despite high levels 
of unemployment and the presence of many colleges and universities. One cause 
is the lack of a national ICT planning process that could engage with industry, 
educational institutions and providers of continuing professional development 
(CPD). A particular problem is the very large number of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), which have limited budgets and capacity to develop ICT skills, 
thus requiring support from government. A major underlying concern is that too 
many schools lack the equipment and teachers trained in computer science and ICTs, 
aggravated by pupils not having computers and broadband access at home. While 
university graduations in ICTs have grown, it is by much less than other courses, in 
part because ICT students are dropping out (Kirlidog, Van der Vyver, Zeeman, & 
Coetzee, 2016).
In recent annual surveys, the Joburg Centre for Software Engineering ( JCSE) 
18  It was alleged that the then-Minister of Communications sought a contract killer to eliminate the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary committee investigating her for corruption (ENCA, 2013).
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reported an acute shortage of skilled ICT workers in South Africa, with information 
security a leading issue for employers (Schofield, 2016). It concluded that the ICT 
industry could not wait for local, provincial and national governments to provide 
solutions, while tertiary education institutions did not possess the necessary 
responsiveness. Consequently, the ICT profession and sector would have to solve the 
“crisis” through their own initiatives.
Cybersecurity presents particular problems, with the need for skilled individuals in 
the defence and security sectors, in critical national infrastructure, and in banking 
and finance. The implementation of the POPI Act will require all firms to bolster 
their cybersecurity efforts, with additional staff and significant CPD, up to board 
level. Without a substantial increase in supply, the shortage of skills will persist, with 
skilled individuals likely to be attracted to organisations able to pay the most. 
At a more general level, the public needs to be taught about dangerous and unsafe 
behaviours on the Internet (e.g., passwords and phishing). The failure to teach 
schoolchildren about online safety has already been acknowledged (Kritzinger, 2014).
The NCPF recognised that South Africa would lag behind and be increasingly 
vulnerable unless it developed the necessary skills, for which it relied on colleges 
and universities (SSA, 2015, p. 13). However, the support for research and training 
has been limited. The South African Cyber Security Academic Alliance (SACSAA, 
n.d.) comprises three groups:
•	 Nelson Mandela University (NMU):
o Centre for Research in Information and Cyber Security (CRICS, 
n.d.); 
•	 University of Johannesburg (UJ): 
o Centre for Cyber Security (CSI, n.d.);
•	 University of South Africa (UNISA):
o Cyber Security Awareness (CSA, n.d.).
In 2015, SACSAA  ran an awareness campaigns, warning of the dangers of 
cyberbullying, and a poster competition. Recently it has been silent and appears 
to be moribund. There are some commercial initiatives, notably a Deloitte Cyber 
Intelligence Center (CIC), part of its global network of such centres (Mbelli & 
Dwolatzky, 2016). The South African Banking Risk Information Centre (SABRIC, 
n.d.) is a collective effort by the banking sector, leveraging public and private partners. 
While the vast majority of surveillance technology firms are based in China, Europe, 
the US and, especially, Israel, there appear to be two in South Africa (see Table 
5), VASTech and iSolv Technologies, with VASTech having received funding from 
the South African government (PI, 2014). Additionally, Lightning Bird Logistics in 
Stellenbosch acts as an agent for the sale of IMSI-grabbers from the US firm Verint. 
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Exports of surveillance and wiretapping technologies to other African countries 
should be subject to controls through the South African National Conventional 
Arms Control Committee (NCACC), implementing the National Conventional 
Arms Control Act of 2000 and the international Wassenaar Arrangement (2017). 
Table 5: Firms in South Africa engaged in surveillance technologies
Firm Location Description
VASTech (n.d.) Technopark, 
Stellenbosch
An independent firm, established in 1999, 
selling hardware and software to government 
to be used in fighting cross-border and 
international crime. 
iSolv 
Technologies(n.d.)
Parktown North, 
Johannesburg
A privately-owned company focused on the 
development and production of state-of-the-
art ICT security solutions. Specialising in 
communications monitoring and cybersecurity.
As is the case more widely in ICTs, South Africa lacks sufficient skills for effective 
cybersecurity, with shortages affecting government recruitment and retention of staff. 
To date, efforts to engage the wider population for basic cybersecurity have received 
limited attention and resources. 
6. Conclusions
A major complaint about the South African government has been its failure in 
service delivery, of which cybersecurity is an example, even if not widely appreciated. 
It has been the result of delays, of inadequate assessments of the risks, of insufficient 
transparency, and of difficulties in coordination across government, business 
and society. While the government has, somewhat tardily, adopted a National 
Cybersecurity Policy Framework, it is of considerable complexity and is being 
implemented only slowly, with very limited reporting and Parliamentary oversight. 
The various organisational structures and their links into yet more structures suggest 
that implementation will continue to prove difficult, with coordination essential 
between many rivalrous ministers, many of whom may soon move on. The lack of 
priority placed on cybersecurity is reflected in the policy taking two years to go from 
draft to adoption, the Cybercrimes Bill also taking two years, and similar delays with 
the Cyber Warfare Strategy. It will ultimately have taken two decades to deliver a 
data protection authority, depriving South Africa of the lessons that could have been 
learned in that time. 
Parliamentary oversight is very difficult given the technical complexity of the 
material and the inter-ministerial spaghetti, aggravated by unnecessary turnover in 
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committee membership, limiting the development of expertise. Surprisingly, there 
were no parliamentary inquiries into the failure of the cybercrime inspectorate 
provisions of the ECT Act, the cleaving of DTPS from DoC, or the misuse of 
IMSI-grabbers, unlike comparable inquiries in the EU, UK and US (PAC, 2017; 
GAO, 2017; Oversight Committee, 2016; Schwab, 2016). Given the importance 
of cybersecurity to human rights and to growth of the digital economy, Parliament 
needs to develop methods to address its cross-governmental and technical nature, for 
example, by creating a forum or panel of expert advisers, together with a mechanism 
for coordination between Parliamentary Portfolio Committees. 
The NCPF appears to have been written without much consideration of 
implementation, echoing the confused complexity of the ICT White Paper (DTPS, 
2016; Freedman, 2016; McLeod, 2017). While there has been diffusion of policy 
elements and ideas from Europe and the US, there is little evidence of these having 
been adapted to South African national circumstances, especially the absence of any 
public assessment of the risks or of the potential impact of the proposed measures, 
or consideration of the ability to implement. The government failed to publish its 
analyses of the responses to its drafts of law and policy, raising questions about 
how effectively it makes use of such material and pointing to a serious weakness in 
governance.
That the intelligence and police services have wiretapping capabilities is very clear, 
though there is little evidence this reduces crime rates or secures South Africa against 
terrorism. It is observed more from leaks and the illicit sale and use of data, than 
from an increased number of prosecutions or greater success in the courts. Indeed, 
petty corruption in the interception of calls and in access to databases appears to 
be a significant problem, though the individuals are seldom prosecuted. The use of 
IMSI-grabbers is even more opaque, apparently without a policy or legal basis, used 
for blocking mobile signals in the vicinity of the President and possibly deployed 
more widely and much more intrusively. Yet more disturbing is the use of surveillance 
malware by the State Security Agency and Financial Intelligence Centre, which 
would certainly be unconstitutional. Ordinarily, those should have prompted 
Parliament to inquire into the use of such intrusive technologies, more commonly 
used by repressive regimes such as those in Ethiopia or Uganda. The likely outcome 
is for NGOs to go to the Constitutional Court for definitive rulings on the limits of 
the use of national security as a justification to withhold policy documents requested 
under the PAI Act, and then for them to seek to limit the use of IMSI-grabbers and 
surveillance software in order to uphold rights to dignity and privacy.
A major challenge is to persuade individual citizens and families to adopt good 
practice for cybersecurity, which requires a mixture of education and publicity. 
To date, relatively little has been done or to have been planned by government or 
industry, despite the rising levels of Internet adoption and global concern about 
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cyberthreats. A similar challenge lies in the persuasion of businesses, which must 
adopt appropriate measures to defend themselves, and the data they hold about their 
customers, from attacks, and to report all attacks that get through. This is an area in 
which the government needs to improve its credibility, by securing its own systems, 
by reporting its own breaches, and by helping and encouraging business to develop 
toolkits to defend themselves. These problems are aggravated by a longstanding 
shortage of ICT skills, which has hampered technology deployment and economic 
growth.
The diffusion and adaptation of cybersecurity policies requires further research, not 
least to determine the extent to which they are being matched to real threats and 
abilities, rather than being copied pro forma. It would also be useful to evaluate the 
effectiveness of coordination mechanisms within the South African Government, 
and with provincial and municipal administrations. An interesting phenomenon to 
monitor would be the spill-over of laws, policies and practices from South Africa 
into other SADC countries, and the ways in which they are adapted, rather than 
just being copied. The question of the availability of IMSI-grabbers is contentious 
and vexed, but requires work on their use by the Presidency, SSA, SAPS, criminals 
and, perhaps, foreign powers and terrorists. Equally, the use of surveillance malware 
requires further work, though this would be very difficult.
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